Desain Minimum Revenue Guarantee dan Clawback pada Proyek KPBU Jalan Tol: Kerangka Konseptual Berbasis Risiko
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5614/jts.2025.32.2.15Keywords:
Minimum revenue guarantee, clawback, revenue risk, capital asset pricing model, toll roadsAbstract
Abstrak
Proyek jalan tol secara alamiah melibatkan risiko dan ketidakpastian pendapatan yang signifikan. Untuk meningkatkan daya tarik investasi, pemerintah berbagi risiko dengan investor melalui instrumen Minimum Revenue Guarantee dan/atau Clawback (MRGB). Tulisan ini memaparkan kerangka konseptual berbasis risiko untuk menguantifikasi nilai dan dampak MRGB terhadap proyek dan pemerintah untuk keperluan desain alokasi risiko yang berimbang. Tulisan ini menggunakan pendekatan teoretis dan analitis dengan menitikberatkan pada pemodelan kerangka konseptual yang dapat menjadi landasan kebijakan dalam mendesain MRGB bagi proyek-proyek infrastruktur yang memiliki risiko pendapatan tinggi. Capital Asset Pricing Model digunakan sebagai dasar teoretis yang diterapkan pada model satu periode. Instrumen MRG meningkatkan nilai proyek dengan meningkatkan ekspektasi pendapatan proyek dan mengurangi risiko pendapatan. Sebaliknya, CB menurunkan ekspektasi pendapatan dan risiko pendapatan sehingga dampak terhadap penurunan nilai proyek tergantung desain instrumen. Dukungan finansial yang diberikan melalui MRGB dapat didesain ekuivalen dengan skema Availability Payment. Tiga skenario risiko pendapatan dianalisis untuk menentukan desain optimal instrumen MRGB, dan pada setiap skenario, berbagai opsi desain alokasi risiko diusulkan. Hasil perhitungan divalidasi menggunakan simulasi Monte Carlo. Tulisan ini juga menguraikan implikasi kebijakan bagi pemerintah saat mempertimbangkan implementasi MRGB. Temuan ini berkontribusi pada pendekatan yang lebih terstruktur dalam merancang mekanisme berbagi risiko untuk investasi jalan tol.
Kata-kata kunci: Jaminan pendapatan minimum, clawback, risiko pendapatan, Capital Asset Pricing Model, jalan tol.
Abstract
Toll road projects inherently involve significant revenue risks and uncertainties. To enhance investment attractiveness, governments may share these risks with investors through Minimum Revenue Guarantee and/or Clawback (MRGB) instruments. This paper proposes a risk-based conceptual framework to quantify the value and impact of MRGB on both the project and the government, serving as a foundation for balanced risk allocation design. A theoretical and analytical approach is adopted, applying the Capital Asset Pricing Model to a single-period model. The MRG instrument increases project value by raising expected revenues and reducing revenue risk. Conversely, the CB instrument lowers both expected revenues and risk, and its net effect on project value depends on its design. Financial support through MRGB can be structured to mirror an availability payment scheme. Three revenue risk scenarios are analyzed to explore optimal instrument design, with alternative risk allocation strategies proposed for each. Monte Carlo simulations are used to validate the model. This paper outlines policy implications for governments considering the implementation of MRGB and contributes to a more structured approach to designing revenue risk-sharing mechanisms in toll road investments.
Keywords: Minimum revenue guarantee, clawback, revenue risk, Capital Asset Pricing Model, toll roads.
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